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THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING FINAL 
Daniel A. Farber* 
The Supreme Court likes to bill itself as the definitive inter-
preter of the Constitution. In Cooper v. Aaron1, all nine Justices 
individually signed an opinion proclaiming that the Court's con-
stitutional doctrines were the supreme law of the land. More re-
cently, the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casel em-
phasized the Court's role in settling national controversies, 
arguing that such decisions must receive extraordinary respect 
lest the Court's authority be undermined. 
The Court's self-proclaimed supremacy has not been with-
out its critics. As early as 1819, Thomas Jefferson denounced 
what he viewed, even then, as the Court's pretensions to su-
premacy. He argued that if judges had the final word over the 
meaning of the Constitution, they could reshape the Constitu-
tion like wax to fit their own preferences. In contrast, Jefferson 
believed that all three departments were entitled to decide for 
themselves on the meaning of the Constitution? 
The debate over judicial supremacy has continued until to-
day, at least among scholars. In Part I of this essay, I will attempt 
to clarify the issues in dispute. In my view, it is helpful to distin-
guish between three kinds of judicial supremacy. Decisional su-
premacy involves the power to issue coercive orders to state and 
federal officers, thereby overriding the constitutional judgments 
of those officers in particular cases. When such an order would 
be forthcoming later, anticipatory supremacy would require gov-
ernment officers to comply in advance with settled judicial doc-
trines rather than forcing the injured party to obtain a court or-
* McKnight Professor of Public Law, University of Minnesota, and Sho Sato 
Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. 
1. 358 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1954). For background on the case, see Daniel A. Farber, The 
Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 
387. 
2. 505 u.s. 833 (1992). 
3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane, September 6, 1819, in 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1426-27 (1984). 
359 
360 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY (Vol. 20:359 
der against them. The broadest form of supremacy applies in 
situations where coercive judicial relief is not a possibility. Pre-
cedential supremacy means that government officials should 
treat settled judicial doctrine as binding precedent even when 
their actions are not subject to judicial review. Decisional su-
premacy has become an accepted feature of our legal system; an-
ticipatory supremacy probably occupies an intermediate posi-
tion; precedential supremacy is the most controversial. 
In Part II of this essay, I will briefly summarize the Marshall 
Court's campaign to secure a foothold for decisional supremacy, 
a campaign that opened with the mandamus discussion in Mar-
bury itself. These efforts were bitterly resisted at the time. Mar-
shall's opponents were right to place so much importance on the 
issue. Decisional supremacy is ultimately the core form of judi-
cial supremacy. As decisional supremacy has expanded with in-
creases in jurisdiction and remedial powers, the other forms of 
supremacy have become progressively less important. Once the 
Court established decisional supremacy, its place as the ultimate 
constitutional authority was essentially secured. Another way of 
putting this is that, as a practical matter, whatever authority the 
Court claimed for its precedents in Cooper v. Aaron pales by 
comparison with power to settle presidential elections or to or-
der an errant president to disclose incriminating evidence. 
I. THREE KINDS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
The Introduction divided claims of judicial supremacy into 
three subcategories. In this section, I will discuss how the de-
bates over judicial supremacy play out with regard to each of the 
three. I will discuss them in reverse order, because the third form 
of supremacy (precedential supremacy) has received by far the 
most scholarly attention. 
Precedential supremacy-the kind of supremacy the Court 
claimed in Cooper v. Aaron-has been strongly resisted by some 
leading scholars. Critics make three major attacks on preceden-
tial supremacy. The first attack is based on the separation of 
powers. The key here is the Jeffersonian claim that the three 
branches are coordinate and independent. Members of each 
branch swear to support the Constitution. Consequently, each 
branch must make its own independent judgment about the 
meaning of the Constitution. In particular, the president's duty 
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed requires that he 
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determine for himself what those laws (including the Constitu-
tion) actually require.4 
The second attack on precedential supremacy is based on 
the nature of the judicial role. The core function of courts is not 
to issue opinions; it is to issue judgments. Issuing judgments in 
individual cases is the real business of the courts, while the ac-
companying opinions are merely explanations of the reasons for 
the decision. Although the point is usually not put quite so 
strongly, the argument is that judicial opinions really have the 
same status as press releases accompanying a presidential veto. 
They may be useful for lawyers and lower court judges who want 
to predict later judicial rulings, but they are not actually "law."5 
A final argument against precedential supremacy is based 
on the need for dialogue about critical constitutional issues. Eve-
ryone concedes that the Justices' views are not infallible. If our 
entire society defers to the Court's views of the moment, there 
will be no later litigation to provide the Court with an opportu-
nity to reconsider. It is healthier for the three branches of gov-
ernment to pursue their own diverse constitutional views, leav-
ing to the system of checks and balances to maintain an overall 
equilibrium.6 
The most powerful counter-argument is based on the set-
tlement function of the Court. It is important for society to have 
some authoritative method for settling disputes. Critics of judi-
cial supremacy seem sanguine about the possibility of head-on 
collisions between the branches. But one of the key functions of 
courts is to provide a peaceful, orderly method of resolving such 
disputes. Even if those decisions are sometimes wrong (as they 
assuredly are), it is better to resolve issues of constitutional in-
terpretation so that society can move on.7 A supporting argu-
ment is that the courts are uniquely well-suited to serve as inter-
preters of the Constitution, because of their insulation from 
4. This argument is made with particular force in Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 228-
62 (1994). 
5. See Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 
NYU L. REV. 123 (1999); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as 
Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43 (1993). 
6. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1329-1330 (1996)(emphasizing the checks 
and balances argument); Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, The Supreme Law of the 
Land, and Attorney General Meese: A Comment, 61 TULANE L. REV. 1017 (1987) (em-
phasizing the dialogue point). 
7. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A 
Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455 (2000) (summarizing this argument). 
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political pressures, their legal expertise, and the deliberative na-
ture of the adjudicatory process. 
In terms of precedential authority, both sides seem to have 
fairly strong arguments. In the end, we must balance the advan-
tages of poly-centric constitutional interpretation against the 
risks of disruption and constitutional crisis. My own view is that 
judicial precedents are entitled to a high degree of deference by 
the other branches, even when judicial review is not a possibility. 
This deference may come to an end when judicial decisions seem 
to be unreasoned fiats or the stakes are so high that deference is 
outweighed by compelling national interests. But the appropri-
ate degree of precedential supremacy is essentially a pragmatic 
judgment, about which reasonable people may find room for 
disagreement. 
We now turn to anticipatory supremacy. Like precedential 
supremacy, anticipatory supremacy requires officials to defer-to 
judicial doctrines, but in a different context. Precedential su-
premacy is most important regarding government actions, such 
as presidential vetoes or pardons, that are outside the domain of 
judicial review. Anticipatory supremacy involves actions that are 
subject to judicial review, and the question is whether the offi-
cials have a duty to anticipate an adverse ruling and comply in 
advance. For this type of supremacy, I believe that the argu-
ments are considerably stronger. 
One argument for anticipatory supremacy is based on the 
common-law nature of our legal culture. Many of the rules of 
law in our society are based on judicial precedents. This is true 
not only in avowedly common law areas like contracts, torts, and 
property, but also in statutory areas. Law-abiding people obey 
laws- including established interpretations of those laws-
without waiting for judicial sanctions. Thus, law-abiding business 
people do not make their own decisions about whether the 
Sherman Act, properly construed, prohibits all price-fixing con-
spiracies. Instead, even if they do not expect to be caught, they 
defer to the interpretation of the courts. The same should be 
true for executive officers, at least in cases where their actions 
are subject to judicial review. 
Another argument for anticipatory supremacy is that execu-
tive officers should not take advantage of friction in the en-
forcement system at the expense of the rights of citizens. For ex-
8. See Burt Neuborne, The Binding Qualicy of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 
TULANE L. REV. 991,999-1000 (1987). 
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ample, because of Eleventh Amendment immunity, a state gov-
ernment is immune from damages for violating many federal 
statutes although subject to injunctive relief. It seems wrong, 
however, for officials who are sworn to uphold the law to delib-
erately violate statutes until such time as they are sued. By the 
same token, if officials know in advance that courts will certainly 
declare their actions unconstitutional, it seems unfair for them to 
take advantage of the fact that judicial enforcement cannot be 
instantaneous. 
Anticipatory supremacy serves important rule of law values, 
and does so to a greater extent than precedential supremacy. 
Even if judicial opinions are not technically law, they may pro-
vide very clear notice of how the courts will ultimately act. Citi-
zens may properly complain when officials knowingly exploit the 
delays and expense of litigation as a shield for actions that have 
no hope of being upheld in court. The fact that a court cannot 
instantly issue an injunction to the injured individual creates an 
opportunity for foot-dragging, but exploiting this opportunity 
harms the rule of law. 
On the other hand, the arguments against judicial suprem-
acy have less bite for anticipatory supremacy than they do for 
precedential supremacy. Officials may maintain dialogue 
through actions that are not subject to judicial review, such as 
use of the pardon power, or by taking actions where the applica-
tion of precedent is unclear. Moreover, the officials' constitu-
tional judgment cannot in any event be completely autonomous 
in a case subject to judicial review, so Jeffersonian's concept of 
departmentalism is not really an option. 
Anticipatory supremacy is more firmly grounded than pre-
cedential supremacy largely because individuals rights are more 
directly involved. When the president vetoes a bill on the ground 
that it is unconstitutional, even though the courts would rule 
otherwise, he may be blocking a desirable policy but he is not 
violating the rights of any individual. At the other extreme, if the 
warden deliberately carries out an execution during a brief delay 
in issuing a stay, knowing that a court would surely reverse the 
sentence on constitutional grounds, his effort to evade ultimate 
judicial resolution is a direct invasion of the rights of the individ-
ual involved. Depending on one's theory of rights, this may only 
be a difference of degree. But even so, it is an important differ-
ence of degree 
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We turn to the narrowest and least controversial form of ju-
dicial supremacy, decisional supremacy. Decisional supremacy is 
the power of a court to issue a coercive order to a public official. 
Almost everyone agrees that the president, lower federal offi-
cials, and state officials have a duty to obey court orders. In our 
entire history, there has been only one apparent violation (by 
President Lincoln in the Merryman case). For reasons that are 
too complex to go into here, I do not believe that Merryman is a 
genuine counter-example against decisional supremacy.10 In any 
event, with the single prominent exception of Michael Paulsen, 
no one seriously argues against decisional supremacy.11 
And for good reason. One core function of the courts is to 
ensure that individual legal rights are not violated by govern-
ment officials. This function is a critical feature of constitutional-
ism. If the President can authorize his subordinates to ignore ju-
dicial decrees, those decrees become nothing more than advisory 
opinions. This is all well and good if we fully trust the executive 
branch to interpret and apply the Constitution. Suffice it to say 
that, as a historical matter, presidentialism has not been a popu-
lar constitutional theory. If we wish to hold the executive ac-
countable to the law, whether statutory or constitutional, we 
cannot afford to make compliance with judicial decrees optional. 
But, a critic might ask, what if a decree is utterly unjustified 
and disastrous? Suppose that the Court announces that it has de-
cided a crucial case by flipping a coin, or suppose that a ruling is 
a blatantly unconstitutional, disastrous interference with the 
President's control of foreign relations. Surely, we would not ex-
pect the president to comply with the decree. That's probably 
right-but neither would we expect the military to obey the 
president's own orders if he announced that he had flipped a 
coin to decide whether to start a war or if he ordered all of his 
political opponents arrested. The possibility that such lunatic or-
ders would be disobeyed does not detract from the fact that the 
president is the commander-in-chief. Neither does the possibility 
of disobedience to lunatic decrees disprove decisional judicial 
supremacy. 
9. See Merrill, supra note 5, at 46-48. 
10. See DANIEL A. FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION ch. 8 (2003). 
11. See Paulsen, supra note 4, at 276-88. 
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II. DECISIONAL SUPREMACY AND MARBURY 
We celebrate Marbury today because it is generally seen as 
the fountainhead of judicial review. But the judicial review hold-
ing in Marbury was not particularly controversial at the time. In-
stead, criticism focused on Marshall's claim that the executive 
was subject to mandamus, rather than on his exercise of judicial 
review over the legislature.12 I think that the early critics were 
right about the grave importance of the mandamus holding, 
which established the Court's decisional supremacy. For in the 
end, it is decisional supremacy that really matters the most. In 
the modern world, the other forms of supremacy are just icing on 
the cake. 
Decisional supremacy over high federal officials was not 
immediately established. It was not until the Nixon tapes case 
that the judiciary's coercive power over the president himself 
was confirmed. Such power over lower officials was established 
much earlier. And the Marshall Court itself undertook a strenu-
ous campaign to assert decisional supremacy over state govern-
ment. It is probably no coincidence that the Court also asserted 
such authority over the federal executive in the discussion of 
mandamus in Marbury. 
Decisional supremacy was the theme of several major rul-
ings by the Marshall Court. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee/3 the 
Court rebuffed the claim of the Virginia Supreme Court to in-
terpretative autonomy. The Virginia judges had argued that sub-
jecting them to the Supreme Court's writs was an unconstitu-
tional form of what we would call commandeering. In reversing 
the Virginia court, Justice Story emphasized the importance of 
uniformity to the constitutional scheme. A few years later, the 
Court was faced with another challenge to its appellate jurisdic-
tion over state courts. In Cohens v. Virginia/ 4 the state claimed 
that Supreme Court review of a state criminal conviction vio-
lated the Eleventh Amendment, because the appeal was techni-
cally a writ issued against the state in its capacity as prosecutor. 
In a staunchly nationalist opinion, Marshall rebuffed this effort 
to invoke sovereign immunity. Finally, in Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States / 5 the Court established the power of the federal 
12 See CHARLES WARREN, 1 THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 
233-34,3 246-52 (1922). 
13. 14 u.s. 304 (1816). 
14. 19 U.S. 264 (1821). 
15. 22 u.s. 738 (1824). 
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courts to coerce state executive officials. Unpersuaded by the 
Court's earlier ruling in favor of the constitutionality of the 
Bank, Ohio had seized the assets of the local branch. The federal 
district court issued an injunction requiring the funds to be re-
turned. The Court upheld the injunction, stressing the need to 
maintain the supremacy of federal law. 
The common theme of the Marshall Court cases from Mar-
bury to Osborn is that, under our constitutional scheme, when a 
court has jurisdiction to decide a constitutional issue, it also has 
the power to coerce state and federal officials to comply with its 
rulings. Federal jurisdiction was limited in those days, and so 
were the remedial instruments available to a court. But all of 
that would change. 
To understand the historical shift in judicial power, it may 
be helpful to think about judicial supremacy in two different, 
hypothetical worlds. In both worlds, officials must obey a prop-
erly issued court order. But the two worlds are different in other 
respects. 
In World One, federal courts have limited jurisdiction. It is 
difficult to bring litigation. There are many barriers to effective 
relief: it is difficult to join parties or different causes of action, 
injunctions are limited to negative prohibitions, attorneys fees 
are not available, many violations of individual rights are not 
subject to damage actions. In addition, many forms of official ac-
tion are not subject to judicial review at all-either because they 
are considered to involve political questions, or because of 
standing, ripeness, or mootness problems. In this world, the 
cases heard by courts will be only the tip of the constitutional 
iceberg. Thus, the extent to which officials will follow judicial 
precedents without the threat of litigation is a pressing concern; 
such situations arise often. Also, since the litigation process pro-
vides only partial relief, officials can often game the system, to a 
large extent succeeding in acting contrary to judicial precedent 
even if some limited remedy is later imposed. So anticipatory 
supremacy is also important. 
Now consider World Two. In World Two, the political ques-
tion doctrine has been eliminated, and other doctrines such as 
standing, mootness, and ripeness are no longer much of a prob-
lem for litigants. Class actions are readily available, so everyone 
who might be threatened by an official's interpretation of the 
Constitution can be joined in one action. Remedies are sweep-
ing: structural injunctions, damage awards to the entire affected 
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class, and attorneys' fees. Officials who violate judicial precedent 
are personally liable for compensatory damages, and for punitive 
damages if the violation is deliberate. No official or governmen-
tal entity is immune from suit. In this world, officials will hesitate 
to game the system because of the personal repercussions. In 
addition, precedential supremacy makes little difference-often, 
everyone will be a member of a successful class anyway, and few 
cases will arise where an official's interpretation of the Constitu-
tion is beyond judicial review. In this world, litigated cases are 
not the tip of the iceberg in terms of constitutional disputes; in-
stead, almost the entire iceberg looms above water. So in World 
Two, anticipatory and precedential supremacy are peripheral is-
sues. Issues about these kinds of supremacy do not arise very of-
ten, and when they do arise, the Court's opinions are generally 
given the deference that people are apt to give truly powerful in-
stitutions. 
The upshot is that, the more powerful the litigation system, 
the less important are precedential and anticipatory supremacy. 
Decisional supremacy is capable of doing all the work of forcing 
officials to comply with judicial interpretations of the Constitu-
tion. But where the litigation system is weak in terms of reme-
dies or limited in terms of coverage, these other forms of su-
premacy become more important. 
We do not live in either World One or World Two. But our 
legal system is much more like World Two than it is like World 
One. Concepts of justiciability are very wide, and remedies are 
often sweeping. For this reason, in our world, decisional suprem-
acy is the main point. When courts can nearly always hear consti-
tutional disputes and provide effective remedies against officials, 
the duty of officials to follow judicial doctrine voluntarily be-
comes relatively unimportant. Thus, much of the debate over 
"judicial supremacy" is tangential to the real operation of to-
day's legal system. 
In short, the Jeffersonian critics of Marbury were right. 
Give the courts the power to order other government officials 
around, and the judges someday will dominate the business of 
constitutional interpretation. It took a long time for the judici-
ary's coercive power over other officials to reach its apex. Yet 
the mandamus holding in Marbury carried within it the seeds of 
practical, if not theoretical, judicial supremacy. 
Other officials have their own views of the Constitution, 
views that may or may not get a respectful judicial reception. But 
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at the end of the day, the Supreme Court gets the last word. In 
short, to paraphrase Justice Jackson, the judiciary's views of con-
stitutional doctrine are not final because the judiciary is su-
preme. Rather, its doctrines are supreme because its decisions 
are final. 16 
16. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We are not 
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final"). 
